Prolog systems currently work with the restriction that negative subgoals not contain free variables, although some authors have suggested that this restriction can be lifted by running the theorem prover to exhaustion on the subgoal being considered. We suggest that this approach is likely not to be computationally viable in practice, and describe and formalize a new approach to dealing with quanti ed default queries that avoids this di culty.
Introduction
Consider the following prolog fragment: 1 f :-not(g(x)). g(A).
The interpretation we will assign to the implication f :-not(g(x)) will be that it is universally quanti ed over x, and therefore corresponds to the implication 8x: :g(x) f] (1) or, equivalently, 9x::g(x)] f:
Given this interpretation, what should the response be if we provide the system with the query f?
Intuitively, f is true except if g holds for all values of its argument; g holds except where h does. Since h is true at A but not elsewhere, g is true everywhere except A. Thus g is false at A, and f is valid. A conventional prolog interpreter, however, will not respond sensibly to the intermediate query g(x), and may not return this result. 4 Finally, we note that if we add the premise g(A) to the above program fragment, the query f should fail. We shall see shortly that this particular nonmonotonic feature of the problem we are considering places further constraints on procedures designed to respond correctly to queries of this sort.
The outline of this paper is as follows: We begin in the next section by examining brie y some previous e orts to deal with this problem and discussing, in informal terms, our solution to it. In Section 3, we discuss the nature of the problem from a formal point of view, formalizing the idea of an answer \schema" that can be used to report a partial solution to an unbound negative subgoal, and describing in precise terms conditions under which such answer schemas are satisfactory responses to a prolog query. In Section 4, we address some technical di culties arising out of this de nition. Our procedural suggestions for solving the problem begin in Section 5, where we discuss the case where the investigation of the negative subgoal involves no additional default assumptions. In Section 6, we go on to extend our methods in a way that allows us to drop this assumption; in Section 7, we consider problems arising from interactions between positive and negative subgoals with free variables.
Section 8 shows our techniques at work by discussing a simple planning example in some depth; this example is one that cannot be treated by existing descriptions of negative subgoals containing unbound variables. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 9.
Previous work
Prolog's assumption that negative subgoals be ground has been addressed in the literature only very recently. The various suggestions that have been made 3, 4, 7, 9, 17, 20] all involve nding precise solutions to subgoals of this type, generally by enumerating or characterizing in some other way the exceptions to a subgoal such as :g(x) arising out of (1). Chan suggests in 3] that the exceptions to the subgoal :g(x) be characterized by running the interpreter to exhaustion on the positive subgoal g(x) and collecting the results, while Foo et al. in 9] make the extraordinary suggestion that the free variable (x, in this case) be bound to all of its reasonable instantiations and the theorem prover be invoked on each of the resulting subgoals :g(A 1 ); . . . ; :g(A n ). Chan goes on to describe in some detail how information of the form, \:g(x) holds for all x except x 2 fC 1 ; . . . ; C k g" can be manipulated when solving subsequent subgoals. This work is quite reminiscent of earlier analysis due to Colmerauer and Kunen 7, 17] . Even for nite domains, Foo's suggestion seems completely unworkable for problems of interesting size, while Chan's approach, known as constructive negation, is likely to run into trouble if there are a large or in nite number of solutions to the positive subgoal g(x), or if these solutions are overly expensive to compute. In 4], Chan attempts to address this di culty by proposing that the solutions to g(x) not be computed explicitly, but only be characterized in some sharp way that is su cient to enable subsequent subgoals to be processed.
All of these ideas seem very much at odds with the natural interpretation of prolog's negation operator as a nonmonotonic one 12] . The work on nonmonotonic reasoning has made it clear that on many problems involving negation as failure, it is impractical or impossible to either enumerate the exceptions to a default rule or to characterize them in any precise way. As an example, when trying to decide whether or not some particular bird can y, it is impractical to either compare it to all the birds known not to y (the chicken we had for dinner, the penguin I saw in the zoo yesterday, and so on) or to compare it to all of the types of birds known not to y (ostriches, emus, birds with their feet set in concrete, and so on). The rst approach corresponds to constructive negation as Chan originally described it in 3], while the second is similar to his more recent suggestions.
Here is another example: Suppose that I am leaving for work in the morning, and notice that my wife has left her car parked behind mine in the driveway. To get to work, I form the plan of moving her car, and then getting into mine and driving to work. But if my intention is to move her car to some particular location l, I encounter the negative subgoal :bad-choice(l); where bad-choice(l) indicates that moving her car to l won't help me achieve my goal of getting to work.
In practice, there are many poor choices for l. Moving the car an inch or so is unlikely to help me get out of the driveway. Driving it into the neighbor's living room is also probably unwise, since the ensuing ruckus is likely to delay me considerably. I don't bother enumerating all of these possible di culties, or even considering them. I simply plan to get in my wife's car, move it, and then drive to work. Provided that I don't pick some pathological choice for her car's new location, everything will be ne.
This idea is the essence of the approach that we will propose in this paper. Roughly speaking, given a negative subgoal containing a free variable, we will replace the variable with a Skolem constant and then evaluate the resulting (ground) subgoal. If this Skolemized subgoal succeeds, we will interpret this as meaning that the original negative subgoal :g(x)
succeeds for all \nonpathological" choices of x. In order to make these ideas more precise, we will do the following:
1. First, we will formalize the idea of a solution schema that holds for \almost" all of its ground instantiations. 2. The bulk of the paper will present a procedure that produces such solution schemas for queries involving negative subgoals with free variables. 3. Finally, we will present a detailed example of a simple planning problem that has features of the sort we are discussing. We will argue that the approach we are proposing is both more natural and more e cient than either the conventional one or that of constructive negation.
Solution schemas
We begin by formalizing our suggestion that when presented with a nonground default query for which it may not be reasonable to return either a list of all possible answers or a list of all exceptions to a possible answer, it may well be reasonable to return an answer that holds \in general." 5 To make precise the notion of a set of exceptions that is \small" compared to the set of instances of the schema for which the goal in fact holds, we begin by augmenting our language 5 Note that it does not su ce to say that an answer schema holds in general whenever it is satisfactory except for nitely many bindings of the variables it contains. The reason for this is that in an in nite domain, an expression may be a satisfactory answer schema even if there are in nitely many expressions for which it fails { provided that the set of exceptions is somehow \small" relative to the size of the domain in its entirety. This argument also applies to any domain that includes function symbols.
(which we assume to be nite) to include an in nite number of new constant symbols, which we will denote by s i as i ranges over the positive integers. We will generally refer to the s i as Skolem constants, since we are requiring that they not appear in our declarative database.
We will make the unique names assumption with regard to these symbols, so that for any two functional expressions f(x 1 ; . . . ; x m ) and g(y 1 ; . . . ; y n ) such that some s i appears in either, we will only have f(x 1 ; . . . ; x m ) = g(y 1 ; . . . ; y n ) if f = g, m = n and x i = y i for each i. 6 De nition 3.1 Let f be a functional expression, and a binding list. We will say that is nontrivial for f if the set of ground instances of fj is a proper subset of the set of ground instances of f.
Essentially, is nontrivial for f if it gives a nontrivial binding for some variable or variables that appears in f.
De nition 3.2 Let f be a functional expression, and S a set of ground instances of f. We will say that S is of measure 0 in f provided that one of the following conditions holds:
1. There is a nontrivial binding for f such that every element of S is an instance of fj , or 2. S is the nite union of sets of measure 0 in f. If S is a set of ground instances of f, we will say that S is of measure 1 in f whenever the complement of S in the set of instances of f is of measure 0 in f.
Our terminology is borrowed from mathematical analysis. Roughly speaking, if f is a functional expression involving n variables, we can think of the ground instances of f as making up an n-dimensional space; after applying a nontrivial binding to f, the ground instances make up at most an n ? 1-dimensional space. Assuming that the set of possible instantiations for a single variable is in nite, any nite union of n?1 or smaller dimensional subsets will be small relative to the n-dimensional space that contains them.
As an example, consider the functional expression g(x). The set S = fg(A)g consisting of a single ground instance is of measure 0 in the set of all ground instances of g(x) since every element of S is an instance of g(x)j x=A .
The reason that we need to make the unique names assumption about expressions involving the Skolem constants is so that we can prove the following: Proposition 3.3 Let f be a functional expression. Then there is no set S that is both of measure 0 and of measure 1 in f. 6 Note that our assumption that there exist an in nite number of distinct object constants (the Skolem constants s i ) is actually in con ict with the domain closure assumption made by Gelfond, Lifschitz and others.
It is this proposition that will give teeth to all of our subsequent results; it would be of little interest to show that the set of solutions to a particular query was of measure 1 in some functional expression f(x) if all sets of ground instances of f(x) were in measure 1 in f! Proof of Proposition 3.3 We prove the result only for f of the speci c form f(x); the general case is similar.
Let s i be any Skolem constant in our language. Note that if is a nontrivial binding for f(x) such that f(s i ) is an instance of f(x)j , then must be the binding list that binds x to s i . It now follows from the unique-names assumption that for any nontrivial binding list , the set of ground instances of f(x)j can contain at most a single element of the form f(s i ) for some s i .
As a result, any set of measure 0 in f can contain only nitely many elements of the form f(s i ). Since there are in nitely many such elements, there is no set S that is of measure 0 in f and whose complement is of measure 0 in f. Proof. Suppose we denote by S the set of all instances of f in which the variables have been bound to unique Skolem constants. The proposition now follows from the following two observations:
1. q( ) succeeds if and only if q succeeds for every element of S, and 2. S is of measure 1 in f. The rst of these is immediate, since the Skolem constants do not appears elsewhere in the database and the truth or falsity of any particular element of S must therefore be independent of precisely which Skolem constants it contains.
For the second, we suppose that f is of the form f(x; y); the general case is no harder. Now for any ground instance of f not to be in S, it must be of one of the following three forms:
1. f(s i ; s i ) (i.e., x and y are not replaced with distinct Skolem constants), 2. An expression where either x or y has been bound to an object constant that is not one of the Skolem constants s i , or 3. An expression where either x or y has been bound to a functional expression. Note, however, that each of the above three sets of ground instances is of measure 0 in f. The rst is given by the nontrivial binding that binds x to y. The second is the nite union of the bindings that bind either x or y to each of the non-Skolem constant symbols in our language, and the third is a similar union of the result of binding x or y to an element of the particular functional form f i (a 1 ; . . . ; a k ) where f i is one of the function constants in the language (of which there are only nitely many). It follows that the complement of S is the union of three sets of measure 0 in f, and is therefore of measure 0 in f itself. Thus S is of measure 1 in f.
This proposition provides the fundamental justi cation for the ideas in this paper. Essentially, our approach will be to return answers involving Skolem constants when responding to prolog queries. Having done so, we can then reconstruct the functional expression f appearing in the proposition by replacing the Skolem constants in the answer with distinct variables, and then will know that except for a set of measure 0, all ground instances of this functional expression will satisfy the original query. In practice, we may wish to return the answer with the Skolem constants included, since variables appearing in this expression can be bound to any constant in the language without a ecting the validity of the result.
As an example, consider the logic program
Our response to the query f(x; y) will be to bind y to the Skolem constant s 1 , obtaining f(x; s 1 ). Since x is unbound in this expression, it indicates that for any choice of x whatsoever, the query succeeds for all choices of y outside a set of measure 0 (in this case, all y except y = A).
In order to make some of these ideas precise, we make the following de nitions:
De nition 3.5 Let f be a ground functional expression. We will denote by f the result of replacing distinct Skolem constants in f with distinct variables. Having done so, any ground instantiation of f will be called a Skolem instance of f.
As an example, suppose that f is the above expression f(x; s 1 ). Then f is the expression f(x; y) and any ground instance of this expression (such as f(A; B) or f(s 1 ; B)) is a Skolem instance of f(x; s 1 ).
De nition 3.6 Given a query q(x) and a ground functional expression f, we will say that f is an acceptable response to the query if the set of solutions to the query is of measure 1 in f. Given a query q(x) and an arbitrary functional expression f, we will say that f is an acceptable response to the query if every ground instantiation of f is an acceptable response to the query.
An acceptable response f to the query will be called Skolem optimal if f is ground and there is no other acceptable ground response of which f is a nontrivial Skolem instance. The response will be called optimal if there is no other acceptable response (ground or otherwise) of which f is a nontrivial instance (Skolem or otherwise).
In the above example, f(x; s 1 ) is the unique optimal response. f(s 2 ; s 1 ) is Skolem optimal but not optimal; f(s 2 ; g(s 1 )) is not Skolem optimal because g(s 1 ) is a nontrivial Skolem instance of s 1 . Expressions such as f(x; y) are not acceptable responses because the query fails for y = A. Lemma 3.7 A conventional prolog interpreter will return optimal responses to queries that do not generate negative subgoals with free variables.
Proof. In the absence of Skolem constants, a response that is acceptable according to Definition 3.6 is acceptable by the usual standard. An optimal response is simply any most general response to the query.
With this formal machinery behind us, we are now in a position to state our intention in this paper: Given a procedure that produces optimal responses to prolog queries that do not generate negative subgoals with free variables, we will describe a procedure that produces optimal responses to all such queries, whether they generate such subgoals or not.
Optimal responses from Skolem optimal ones
We will achieve the above goal in two stages. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to describing a procedure that produces Skolem optimal responses to arbitrary queries; in this section, we show how to turn Skolem optimal responses into optimal ones.
The basic di erence between a Skolem optimal response and an optimal one is that while a Skolem optimal response indicates that \most" of its Skolem instances are solutions to the original query, a response in which the Skolem constants have been replaced with variables indicates that every instance is a solution to the original query. This suggests that in order to change a Skolem optimal solution to an optimal one, we need simply check to see if the various Skolem constants can be replaced with variables: Procedure 4.1 Suppose that we have some method for generating Skolem optimal responses to prolog queries, and that the response has been generated in response to the query q. Now renumber the Skolem constants appearing in so that they are s 1 ; . . . ; s n and do the following:
1. Set i = 1. 2. Let be the result of replacing all appearances of s i in with a variable that does not appear elsewhere in . To see this procedure working, we return to the example of the previous section, where we considered the prolog fragment Suppose that in response to the query f(x; y), we are given the Skolem optimal answer f(s 1 ; s 2 ).
We begin by replacing s 1 Proof. For the rst part, we need to show that the returned by Procedure 4.1 is acceptable, and that it is optimal. To see that is acceptable, we need simply note that when a Skolem constant in is replaced with a variable in the construction of , the subgoal in step 3 of the procedure serves to ensure that there is no binding of this variable for which the original query fails. Showing that is optimal is harder, although only slightly so. If were not optimal, there would be some other acceptable response of which was an instance. Now if we replace every variable in with a new Skolem constant to obtain the ground expression 0 , it follows that 0 will necessarily be a Skolem optimal solution to the original query. Since the originally provided as input to Procedure 4.1 is also Skolem optimal, it follows that 0 and are identical up to renaming of Skolem constants.
It follows from this that can di er from only in that has variables in some positions in which has a Skolem constant. Suppose that s i is the Skolem constant in that has been replaced in with a variable x. There are now two possibilities:
1. If not every instance of s i in has been replaced with x, then the result of binding x to a new Skolem constant will be a Skolem optimal response to the original query of which is a nontrivial Skolem instance. 2. If every instance of s i in has been replaced with x, it follows that when s i was considered by Procedure 4.1, the subgoal considered in step 3 of the procedure would have failed (since is an acceptable response to the query), and s i would have been rebound to a variable in the construction of . In either case there is a contradiction, and this direction of the proof is complete.
The converse is easier. If is an optimal response to the original query, then the result 0 of replacing the variables in with Skolem constants will be Skolem optimal, and Procedure 4.1 can be used to reproduce from 0 .
Subgoals with monotonic justi cations
Let us now return to the more interesting problem of constructing a procedure that generates Skolem optimal responses to arbitrary queries. Suppose that we have begun with some query q that has been reduced to a collection of subgoals, some of which involve free variables in negative clauses. Let us denote such a subgoal by :s(x). As we have seen, there are now four distinct possibilities: The fourth possibility is that in which s is itself a consequence of other nonmonotonic assumptions. For the time being, we will assume that this is not the case. As an example, we repeat the fragment of the previous section:
f(x,y) :-not(g(y)). g(A).
When presented with the query f(x; y), we generate the negative subgoal :g(y). Skolemizing y gives us the ground negative subgoal :g(s 1 ), which succeeds. We therefore bind y to s 1 in the original query to obtain the Skolem optimal response f(x; s 1 ). The response is in fact optimal in this case; we shall see a somewhat more interesting example in Section 8.
Subgoals with nonmonotonic justi cations
Imagine now that we were to use the techniques of the previous section to attempt to nd a solution to the query f in the following situation:
The goal f generates the negative subgoal :g(x). The instantiation :g(s 1 ) fails, although the instantiation :g(A) would succeed.
In terms of the discussion in the previous section, we have a negative subgoal :g(x) for which we can nd a proof of the Skolemized version g(s 1 ). It follows that the set of x for which the original subgoal should succeed is of measure 0, but it does not follow that there is no solution to the subgoal at all (as we assumed earlier).
What we need to do is to understand the failure of the Skolemized subgoal in a way that enables us to identify the instantiation x = A as a potential exception. Ideally, we would like to do this in a way that avoids repeating the search involved in the proof of g(s 1 ).
We would also like to proceed in a way that allows us to generate and test possible exceptions to the proof of g(x) singly. As an example, suppose that h(B) also appeared in the above database. It is important that we be able to generate and consider the possible exception x = A before generating the possible exception x = B. The reason for this is that it may be computationally expensive to nd such a potential exception (since doing so involves solving the subgoal h(x)), and we need to be able to treat such exceptions individually as backtrack points, rather than generating them all when the subgoal is encountered. 7 Achieving this will not be di cult if we can identify a new subgoal t(x) such that solutions to this subgoal are candidate solutions to the original negative subgoal :s(x). In the example we are considering, for example, we have :s(x) = :g(x) and would expect to have t(x) = h(x).
To understand this, suppose that we have encountered a negative subgoal :s(x), and that the instantiated version of this subgoal, :s(s 1 ), has failed.
In order for :s(s 1 ) to fail, there must be some proof of s(s 1 ). This proof will appeal to the negation-as-failure rule applied to some predicates p 1 (s 1 ); . . . ; p n (s 1 ) (perhaps with n = 0). It follows from this that :p 1 (x)^ ^:p n (x) ! s(x) (2) in the conventional sense, without appealing to any additional nonmonotonic assumptions. It follows from this that exceptions to the nonground query s(x) will necessarily be solutions to the new subgoal
Note that if the proof of s(s 1 ) succeeded without appealing to the negation-as-failure rule at all, so that 8x:s(x) were entailed by our database, we would have n = 0 and the new subgoal, an empty disjunction, would be tautologically false. The upshot of this is that we will not attempt to overturn any proofs that did not use the negation-as-failure rule in the rst place. 
Finally, we note that solutions to the subgoal appearing in (3) still need to be checked as solutions to the original negative subgoal. This is because there may be facts in the database that although not involved in the failure of the original Skolemized subgoal, nevertheless invalidate the instantiations suggested by the consideration of (3).
Here, then, is the procedure for the evaluation of a negative subgoal with free variables:
Procedure 6.1 To evaluate a negative subgoal :s(x 1 ; . . . ; x k ; C 1 ; . . . ; C l ), where the x i are free variables and the C j are ground terms:
1. Replace the variables with Skolem constants and invoke the interpreter on the result.
2. If the Skolemized subgoal succeeds, return it as the solution to the original negative subgoal.
3. If the Skolemized subgoal fails, identify the negation-as-failure assumptions responsible for the failure, and construct the new subgoal appearing in (3). As an example, we return to the program fragment that began this section. Here it is again:
The goal f generates the negative subgoal :g(x); skolemizing gives the subgoal :g(s 1 ). Since attempting to prove h(s 1 ) fails, g(s 1 ) succeeds and the Skolemized subgoal :g(s 1 ) fails.
But we note that the proof of g(s 1 ) involves applying the negation-as-failure rule to h(s 1 ), and this in turn leads us to consider the positive subgoal h(x). This subgoal succeeds with x bound to A, so we reconsider the original negative subgoal :g(x), binding x not to s 1 but to A. Since h(A) succeeds, :h(A) fails, and g(A) fails. We therefore return x = A as a solution to the original negative subgoal, and the query f succeeds.
If, on the other hand, we augment the above database with the statement g(A), then the instantiated negative subgoal :g(A) fails, and the original query fails as well.
Here is a more subtle example, where the query is f(x,y):
f(x,y) :-not(g(x,y)).
g(x,y) :-not(h(x)). h(A). g(A,y) :-not(j(y)). j(B).
Now the negative subgoal :g(x; y) instantiates to :g(s 1 ; s 2 ). This subgoal fails, since :h(s 1 ) succeeds. But the success involves the application of the negation-as-failure rule to h, so we are led to the positive subgoal h(x). This succeeds for x bound to A, so we bind x in the original subgoal to obtain :g(A; y).
Applying the procedure recursively, we Skolemize :g(A; y) to obtain :g(A; s 3 ). This subgoal also fails, since :j(s 3 ) succeeds. Once again, the failure is due to the application of the negation-as-failure rule (to j this time), so we consider the new subgoal j(y), which succeeds for y bound to B. We bind y to B in the subgoal :g(A; y) to obtain :g(A; B).
This query nally succeeds, allowing us to return x = A; y = B as a solution to the original query. Proposition 6.2 In a language without function symbols, suppose that our interpreter always terminates on positive subgoals and ground queries. Then provided that every variable appearing in the body of a database rule also appears in its head, Procedure 6.1 will terminate as well.
Proof. The procedure can fail to terminate only if it continues to call itself recursively. But note that the positive subgoals constructed in step 3 of the procedure can never succeed without instantiating at least one of their variables. (If they did, the original Skolemized subgoal would have succeeded as well.)
It follows that the new subgoal passed recursively to the procedure will have fewer free variables than its predecessor, so that the procedure must terminate eventually.
This result fails if the assumptions are weakened. The reason is that the positive subgoal introduced in step 3 of the procedure may itself spawn negative subgoals, and the optimal responses to these subgoals may introduce new variables into the original subgoal and thereby cause the evaluation procedure to fail to terminate. As we will see in Section 8, simple planning problems tend to contain features of just this sort.
More important than Proposition 6.2, of course, is the following: Proposition 6.3 Let :s(x) be a negative subgoal containing free variables. Then the result of applying Procedure 6.1 to :s(x) is a Skolem optimal response to it, and any such response can be generated in this fashion.
Proof. The proof is in fact quite straightforward. We know from Proposition 5.1 that as soon as the Skolemized subgoal has succeeded, a Skolem optimal response to the bound subgoal :s(x)j will have been produced. Since we know that every solution to the original negative subgoal solves :s(x)j for one of the 's produced in the nal step of the procedure, it follows from the Skolem optimality of these 's that any Skolem optimal solution to the modi ed subgoal will be a Skolem optimal solution to the original one.
Multiple subgoals
There is one additional subtlety that appears if Procedure 6.1 is to be used in practice. Consider the following prolog fragment:
not(h(x)). g(A). h(B).
When presented with the query f(x), the subgoal g(x) is evaluated, binding x to A. This leads to the ground negative subgoal :h(A), which succeeds, so that the original goal returns f(A). But suppose that the order of the two clauses in the de nition of f had been reversed:
g(x). g(A). h(B).
Now the negative subgoal :h(x) succeeds by binding x to the Skolem constant s 1 , and the positive subgoal g(s 1 ) fails. The problem is that the positive subgoal should be looking for a solution that is a Skolem instance of g(s 1 ), as opposed to an instantiation of it in the conventional sense. There are two ways around this di culty. The simpler one is merely to always consider positive subgoals before negative ones. In some instances, however, this may be overly restrictive:
f(x,y) :-not(g(x,y)), hard(x).
g(x,y) :-not(h(x)). h(A). g(B,y). hard(B). hard(A).
We are supposing that the subgoal hard(x) succeeds by binding x to A or B, but that the evaluation of this subgoal is computationally expensive. Since applying Procedure 6.1 to the subgoal :g(x; y) also binds x to A, it is important that the subgoals be evaluated in the order in which they are supplied.
The alternative approach overcomes this di culty by replacing the Skolem constants appearing in an arbitrary positive subgoal s with variables to obtain s as in De nition 3.6. The resulting subgoal is then solved and the Skolem constants replaced. Any solutions to s that bind newly introduced variables away from Skolem constants will need to be checked to ensure that they remain solutions to the negative subgoals that introduced the Skolem constants in the rst place. It is clear that this procedure is correct, since all it is really doing is ensuring that the matcher recognizes Skolem instances of the solution to a particular negative subgoal.
An extended example: Planning
In order to show our ideas at work, we will now consider in some detail slightly more di cult examples of the problems we have been discussing.
The application we will consider is that of planning and reasoning about action, working with a truly nonmonotonic description of our domain. We do this in part because it is the nonmonotonic nature of the description that leads to negative subgoals with free variables, but also because it appears 14, 15] that a nonmonotonic description will be the only computationally tractable one as the domains encountered by general-purpose planning systems grow increasingly complex.
Rather than discuss complex domains, however, we will consider only simple blocks worlds problems. The positions of objects will be described using a predicate on(b; l), indicating that the block b is at the location l.
We will work with a simple version of the situation calculus, denoting the fact that some sentence p holds in a situation s by writing holds(p; s): A situation will be written as an ordered sequence of actions s = ha n ; . . . ; a 1 i: ( We write the last action rst so that we can append new actions to the front of the sequence.)
The initial situation is written simply as hi, corresponding to the empty sequence of actions.
We will denote by hajsi the result of performing the action a in the situation s. The frame axiom, a default rule saying that things tend to stay the same as time goes by, is now written as:
holds(p; s)^:ab(a; p; s) ! holds(p; hajsi):
(4) In other words, if p holds in a situation s, and the action a is not abnormal in that its execution potentially reverses p, then p will continue to hold in the resulting state hajsi.
There is a single action in this domain, move(b; l), which relocates a block b at a location l. The preconditions for this action are that the block being moved and the target location both be clear. holds(clear(x); s) 6 9y:holds(on(y; x); s): (6) Of course, the existential quanti er appearing in (6) forces us to modify this description somewhat if we are to use a prolog-like theorem prover. Here is a suitable redescription 8 : holds(p,s) :-append(s1,s2,s), holds(p,s2), not(ab(s1,p,s2)). holds(on(b,l), move(b,l)|s]) :-not(occupied(b,s)), not(occupied(l,s)). occupied(x,s) :-holds(on(y,x),s).
Note that we have modi ed the frame axiom somewhat so that we can conclude at a single stroke that the sentence p will be preserved through the action sequence s 1 . In addition to being more e cient than the previous description, this modi cation is necessary if negative subgoals involving the frame axiom are to be dealt with properly. Taking s 2 to be the initial situation hi, we get as a consequence of this modi ed axiom that holds(p; hi)^:ab(s; p; hi) ! holds(p; s):
(7) In other words, in the absence of an abnormality, things true in the initial situation will be true in all subsequent situations.
Note also that we cannot rewrite the second prolog rule as since the semantics we have assigned to this expression are di erent from those of the original one. 9 (The above rule allows us to move b to l if there is any block x that is not on b, and any block y that is not already at l.) The initial situation is that depicted in Figure 1 , and is described by the following axioms:
The blocks A and B are both on the table, and C is on top of B. The goals we will consider are those of getting either C or B on top of A. Consider rst the goal of getting C on A, corresponding to the prolog query holds(on(C,A),s):
Resolving this goal against the rule describing the move action, we obtain the pair of subgoals not(occupied(C,t)) and not(occupied(A,t)):
(8) Instantiating t to a Skolem constant in the rst subgoal, we obtain not(occupied(C,S1)); and this subgoal succeeds. In addition, applying Procedure 4.1, we see that this is an optimal solution to the original negative subgoal.
In accord with the ideas of Section 7, we replace the Skolem constant s 1 with the variable t when processing the second subgoal (8) . This subgoal also succeeds with t bound to s 1 , so that we nally conclude that the original query holds(on(C,A),s) holds for s bound to move(C,A)|S1].
We now view the proof process as complete, returning the answer schema move(C,A)|S1]; (9) where the Skolem constant s 1 denotes an unspeci ed situation (i.e., sequence of actions). If we wish, we can substitute the empty action sequence ] for the Skolem constant s 1 , producing the simpler result binding s to move (C,A) ]. Of course, this new answer will need to be tested to make sure that the default rules leading to the Skolemized conclusion are not violated when we replace the Skolem constant with a particularly convenient value.
If our theorem prover can deal with conjunctive subgoals, we can streamline this procedure somewhat be considering the negative subgoals not(occupied(C,t)) and not(occupied (A,t)) simultaneously. Since the conjoined negative subgoal :occupied(C; t)^:occupied(A; t) succeeds by binding t to s 1 , we avoid one invocation of Procedure 4.1.
Note that constructive negation is completely incapable of dealing with this problem. If it were our intention to return a \complete" answer to the original query, we would have to modify (9) in some way so that it included information about those situations s 0 that violated the frame axiom (7) and could therefore not be instantiated into the solution schema given by (9) .
Unfortunately, this is completely unsuitable for problems such as the one we are considering { how are we possibly to enumerate all of the states s 0 in which something is on top of C or of A? There are in nitely many such states, arrived at by in nitely many distinct action sequences. In this particular case, not only is the schema (9) a reasonable response to the original query (indeed, it is optimal in the sense of De nition 3.6); it is the only response available. Applying the techniques of previous authors will fail to return an answer at all.
Let us now turn to the more di cult of the two planning problems, corresponding to the goal holds(on(B,A),s). Resolving it with the description of the move action leads to the compound negative subgoal In order to solve this subgoal, we need some way to conclude that an action sequence t is abnormal. This involves a contrapositive version of the frame axiom: ab(s1,p,s2) :-holds(p,s2), append(s1,s2,s), not(holds(p,s)): (10) Note, however, that the negation appearing in this axiom should be interpreted not using the negation-as-failure rule, but in terms of an ability to actually prove not (holds(p,s) ) directly. After all, we are only prepared to conclude that an action sequence is abnormal if we can prove without using negation-as-failure that some sentence has changed from true to false when the action sequence is executed. This leads us to rewrite (10) as: ab(s1,p,s2) :-holds(p,s2), append(s1,s2,s), no-holds(p,s)) where no-holds is a predicate introduced for this purpose. Given this axiom, the subgoal ab(t,on(C,B), ]) now leads to the new subgoal no-holds(on(C,B),t)). Informally, we can show that an action sequence is abnormal with respect to C being on B provided that we can demonstrate that it actively causes on(C,B) to become false.
At this point, we need an axiom stating conditions under which C will no longer be on B { nowhere in our domain description, for example, is there an axiom saying that a block can be in only one place at a time! The following is suitable: (11) It is only an answer schema that is returned, of course. The interpretation of (11) is as follows: To get B onto A, perform an arbitrary (but hopefully nonpathological) sequence of actions s 2 . Then move C somewhere, and put B on A. The choices A and B will be pathological instantiations of s 3 , as it turns out.
Implementation concerns and results
Examining step 3 of Procedure 6.1, we see that when the proof of the negated Skolemized subgoal succeeds (so that the proof of the Skolemized subgoal itself fails), we need to know which negation-as-failure assumptions were involved in the successful proof.
There are a variety of possible ways to achieve this when implementing the ideas we have presented. The simplest is probably to use an atms 8] when evaluating the negated subgoal. As discussed in 13, 21] , an atms can be used to return the minimal set of assumptions needed to support a given conclusion; such a set is just what is needed to construct the new subgoal appearing in (3). (Reiter and de Kleer refer to such a minimal set as a prime implicant.)
This observation was used to incorporate the work we have described into the multivalued theorem prover discussed in 13]; the reason this theorem prover was used is that it already combines techniques from both truth maintenance and default reasoning. The two planning problems we have discussed were then solved using the techniques we have developed. The principal purpose of the implementation was to contrast the time needed by the approach we have presented with the time needed to solve the problems using conventional monotonic techniques such as those discussed in 11]. In both cases, general-purpose planning techniques were used, as opposed to special-purpose methods developed to deal with the blocks-world domain only.
Compromises had to be made in both implementations. In the nonmonotonic case, some of the well-known problems involved in using nonmonotonic techniques to reason about action were encountered 16]. These di culties were overcome by assigning speci c priorities to various default assumptions. The resulting system was indeed able to solve the planning problems we have discussed, and the inference paths were as described earlier. The axiomatization was quite brittle, however, and is unlikely to be useful in dealing with more complex problems in this domain. The recent work in 2] will be able to address these di culties, but has not yet been combined with the techniques that are the subject of this paper.
In the monotonic case, two compromises were made. The monotonic version of the frame axiom (4) will be something like: This replacement is su cient to allow the solution of our two simple problems, but is obviously not strong enough to solve anything more di cult.
The other \compromise" made was that the description used did not include any information regarding the \delete lists" of the actions being considered. If the system needed to know that moving C onto A resulted in C's no longer being on B, it had to prove that by using the fact that C would be on A after the action was performed, and that blocks could only be in one place at a time. This description, although not as e cient as one that explicitly lists all of the positive and negative consequences of an action, seemed reasonable for two reasons. First, no such explicit description was made available to the nonmonotonic planner that was solving the same problems. Second, it appears 14] that it will not in general be possible to precompute all of the rami cations of an action in a complex domain.
Finally, the monotonic planner needed to be told of the existence of a new location L 3 . Otherwise, it had no place to put C when it wanted to move B onto A! Both problems were presented to the systems, running on a Symbolics 3620. The speed of the interpreter used was such that both systems were capable of performing approximately 50 inferences/second. The nonmonotonic approach solved the simpler of the two problems in about 4 seconds, and the more complex one in about 6. The monotonic approach solved the simple problem immediately, but took 18 seconds on the more di cult one.
Why should the nonmonotonic system be faster? The reason is simply that the inferences performed by this approach are very much like those taken by a human planner: First, a simple plan is constructed that achieves the goal based on default assumptions about the domain. If some of these default assumptions are found to be invalid, the plan is then modi ed in such a way that the di culty is overcome.
In our particular case, the defaults used involved assuming that various blocks were clear. When the assumption that B was clear was found to be invalid in the second planning problem, a new sequence of actions was developed that would cause B to be clear after all, and this patch was spliced into the awed plan to create an acceptable one.
The monotonic planner was not able to focus its search in this fashion; it had no way of knowing that the na ve plan of simply moving B onto A was in any way \close" to a solution to the problem. It therefore needed to perform a laborious backtrack through its domain description, regressing all of the preconditions to the various actions through all of the actions it was considering, and so on. The result was that it spent a great deal of time working on problems that turned out to have no relevance to the eventual solution it discovered.
There have been many suggestions recently that general-purpose planning must work in the way our nonmonotonic approach proceeded: Potential plans are constructed (or retrieved from a library of such plans), criticized, and modi ed if necessary to overcome any obstacles that are discovered. There has been little formal work on what it means to criticize a plan, however, and no work at all on the problem of patching a awed plan. What we have seen here is that both the criticism and recovery processes can be described naturally in terms of the evaluation of negative subgoals with free variables, and that the ideas we have developed can therefore be used to give us a formal handle on a very attractive approach to planning generally.
Conclusion
We conclude with some informal remarks regarding the computational nature of the procedure we have described.
Because of the undecidable nature of consistency checking, there are serious computational problems involved in the use of any nonmonotonic description of a domain. Nevertheless, it has been argued elsewhere ( 14, 15] is typical) that commonsense reasoning must ultimately depend upon nonmonotonic techniques if we are to model domains complex enough to be interesting. This paper has discussed one of the issues that will need to be addressed if we are to use nonmonotonic reasoning to construct such a commonsense reasoning system { the appearance of default queries containing free variables. We have presented a procedure for dealing with such queries, shown several fairly simple examples of the procedure in action, and formalized the nature of the answers returned by this procedure. We have also seen that existing proposals for dealing with these queries appear to be unable to address the problems likely to arise in planning and commonsense reasoning.
It might appear that the complexity of the procedure when applied to even the very simplest of planning problems will result in our methods being unsuitable as these problems become more di cult, but this is not the case. The reason is that the work actually done in developing the simple plans we have considered is remarkably parallel to the e ort we would expect to make from a commonsense point of view. As a result, even very simple planning problems can be solved more e ciently using our techniques than by an appeal to purely monotonic methods.
